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SYMPOSIUM, ERIE AT EIGHTY: CHOICE OF LAW ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES 
 
 
ERIE, REMEDIES, AND TRADE SECRETS 
Camilla A. Hrdy* 
I.  Introduction 
At “Erie at Eighty: Choice of Law Across the Disciplines,”1 I learned 
a lot from my colleagues on the intellectual property law panel: Joe Miller, 
Sharon Sandeen, and Shubha Ghosh. I also learned a lot from Florida State 
University Professor Michael Morley. Professor Morley argued quite 
vociferously that federal courts have wrongly been applying federal rules 
in deciding whether to grant injunctions for state law claims in diversity 
cases. This has some fascinating implications for intellectual property law 
and particularly trade secret law. 
Professor Morley’s new article on the subject of Erie and equity, 
entitled Beyond the Elements: Erie and the Standards for Preliminary and 
Permanent Injunctions, will be published along with the other conference 
papers in the Akron Law Review. But understanding the arguments 
Professor Morley makes in this new piece—and the implications for trade 
secret law—requires first returning to his foundational article on the Erie 
decision and its impact on the federal equity power.2 
 
* Professor Camilla A. Hrdy is an Assistant Professor of Law at The University of Akron School of 
Law. Her primary teaching areas are Intellectual Property Law, Trade Secret Law, Trademark Law, 
Patent Law, and State and Local Government Law, and Civil Procedure (Due Process and 
Federalism). Before coming to Akron Law she was a resident fellow at the Yale Law School 
Information Society Project and a teaching fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Law School 
Center for Innovation, Technology & Competition.  
 1.  This article was written following the Erie at Eighty: Choice of Law Across the Disciplines 
conference, hosted by the University of Akron School of Law Center for Constitutional Law and the 
Akron Law Review, held on Friday, September 14, 2018 at the University of Akron School of Law. 
 2.  Michael Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B. C. L. REV. 217 (2018). 
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II. THE ERIE DOCTRINE’S IMPACT ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES 
The Erie doctrine interprets the Rules of Decision Act as requiring 
federal courts to (like the Act says) apply “[t]he laws of the several 
states . . . as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United 
States, in cases where they apply” unless “the Constitution or treaties of 
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide.”3 
Importantly, Erie held, this mandate includes state statutes as well as state 
court holdings on common law issues not covered by statutes, such as the 
standard of care that applies in a tort claim.4 
The upshot of the Erie doctrine is that when state law claims enter 
federal courts in diversity cases, these issues must be addressed by looking 
to the law of the forum state, including decisions of state courts, and in 
some cases even by predicting how the state’s highest court would rule.5 
A principal reason Erie held that this must be so is the fear that savvy 
lawyers would engage in forum-shopping—seeking better rules in federal 
court than they could get at the state level and vice versa.6 The Court was 
also motivated by broader concerns about federalism. The Court’s 
decision effectively created a new limit on federal courts’, and potentially 
also Congress’s, ability to make common law concerning issues covered 
only by state law.7 
Professor Morley’s article demonstrates that there is, and has always 
been, intense uncertainty regarding the Erie doctrine’s effects on 
“equitable” issues, such as the granting of injunctive remedies or equitable 
tolling of statutes of limitations. To understand this claim, an exceedingly 
brief history of the “equity” power is necessary, which I draw directly 
from Morley’s much more eloquent and comprehensive paper. 
U.S. courts’ equity powers evolved from their early origins in 
England, where equity was seen “as a natural outgrowth of the King’s 
 
 3.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1652 (West 1948). 
 4.  See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (stating that “[e]xcept in matters 
governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the 
law of the state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by 
its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common 
law.”). 
 5.  Allan Erbsen, Erie’s Four Functions: Reframing Choice of Law in Federal Courts, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 649 (2013) (describing Erie’s mandate that federal courts ascertain the 
content of state law by predicting how the state’s highest court would answer a question).  
 6.  Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-78. 
 7.  Id. at 78 (stating that “Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law 
applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law or a 
part of the law of torts.”). 
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inherent power and duty to do justice.”8 Over time, judges in England and 
later in the U.S. court system were seen as being endowed with equity 
powers as a way “to correct inevitable defects in the law, thereby better 
enforcing natural justice.”9 After the founding, U.S. federal courts dealt 
with various types of equitable issues, most crucially for Morley’s 
purposes, equitable remedies like permanent and preliminary 
injunctions.10 Despite the eventual merger of courts of law and courts of 
equity, prior to Erie “federal courts treated equity as an independent body 
of law they were required to apply, typically regardless of state statutes or 
state court rulings to the contrary.”11 In particular, “[u]niform, federally 
established equitable standards governed all aspects of injunctive relief in 
both federal question and diversity cases, including whether such relief 
was available in a particular case, “ as well as the form injunctive relief 
would take if granted.12  Even after Erie was decided in 1938, upending 
federal courts’ ability to apply their own rules in state law cases that 
entered federal courts through diversity jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
nonetheless “refused to apply Erie to equitable remedies in federal 
court.”13 In Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), the very case in 
which the Supreme Court announced the famously rigid “outcome 
determinativeness” test for deciding what constitutes substantive versus 
procedural law, the Court stated that federal courts would still retain their 
equity power and could still apply their own equitable principles with 
respect to remedial issues.14 The Court famously went on to hold that state 
law governed the issue in the not-merely-remedial statute of limitations. 
The state statute of limitations was not “of ‘a mere remedial character,’”, 
so the federal court was not free to disregard it.15 
But in the course of the opinion the Court created an important carve-
out for equitable remedial issues, writing that; 
State law cannot define the remedies which a federal court must give 
simply because a federal court in diversity jurisdiction is available as an 
alternative tribunal to the State’s courts. Contrariwise, a federal court 
 
 8.  Morley, supra note 2, at 225. 
 9.  Id. at 227 (discussing Thomas Aquinas’ early views on equity). 
 10.  Id. at 231-232. 
 11.  Id.  at 232. 
 12.  Id. at 238. 
 13.  Id. at 243.  
 14.  Morley, supra note 2, at 248-249 (discussing Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)). 
 15.  Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 108. 
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may afford an equitable remedy for a substantive right recognized by a 
State even though a State court cannot give it.16 
In practice, this carve-out, which is still in force today, means federal 
courts may apply federal standards rather than state standards for granting 
injunctions—”the most commonly sought equitable remedy.”17 As an 
initial matter, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs injunctions.18 
But its contents are minimal and hardly encompassing of what federal 
courts do when they issue injunctions. As Morley explains, Rule 65 “sets 
forth the process for obtaining temporary restraining orders (‘TROs’) and 
preliminary injunctions, as well as a few additional rules governing all 
forms of injunctive relief (including permanent injunctions).”19 However, 
Rule 65 “does not provide any substantive standards for courts to apply in 
awarding such relief[.]”20 Rule 65 “does not actually identify the 
circumstances under which a court should issue a TRO, preliminary 
injunction, or permanent injunction, apart from the requirement of 
‘immediate and irreparable injury’ for TROs.”21 
Instead, federal courts have created federal standards for issuing 
injunctions, usually in the form of factor-based tests. These standards can 
only be realistically described as, well, federal common law. The Supreme 
Court most recently affirmed these standards in the eBay case of patent 
law fame. Under eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., to obtain a permanent 
injunction, including in patent cases; 
[The] test requires a plaintiff to demonstrate: (1) it has suffered an 
irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law [such as monetary 
damages] are inadequate to redress that injury; (3) that considering the 
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in 
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.22 
As Morley observes, the Court itself claimed this standard stemmed from 
traditional equitable principles, rather than Rule 65 alone. 
Professor Morley thinks this carve-out for equitable remedial issues 
is wrong and a flagrant violation of the Erie doctrine. Obviously, eBay 
itself was not an Erie violation. eBay was, after all, a patent case. 
 
 16.  Id. at 106.   
 17.  Morley, supra note 2, at  252. 
 18.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 65. 
 19.  Morley, supra note 2, at 252.  
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 253 (internal citations omitted). 
 22.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), 
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However, Morley’s thesis is that courts cannot, under Erie, apply the 
federal factor-test crafted in eBay and cases leading up to it in state law 
cases coming up in diversity. Rather, he argues; 
When a claim arises under a state statute or state common law, that 
state’s body of remedial law—including its equitable principles—
should determine the available remedies. The court should treat the 
requirements for equitable relief the same as it does the elements of the 
underlying cause of action. There is no freestanding body of general or 
federal equitable principles with the force of law that a court is required 
to apply.23 
Morley gives two reasons for this conclusion. First, these issues are 
typically quite outcome determinative, even under the laxer outcome 
determinativeness standard developed since Guaranty Trust.24 Second, at 
a conceptual level, equitable remedies are no less substantive than a state 
statute or a state common law rule laying out, for instance, the tort law 
standard of care. “Courts have recognized other types of remedies as 
substantive, and there is no reason equitable remedies should be treated 
categorically differently.”25 Thus, under the Erie doctrine, “state law . . . 
should govern equitable remedial issues in federal diversity cases . . . .”26 
We might think that Morley’s thesis is not highly impactful for one 
important reason: the factor tests that state courts use in granting 
injunctions are not likely to materially differ from the federal ones. Thus, 
the application of federal or state injunction standards would not actually 
be outcome determinative. The federal eBay test and its kin would get you 
to the same place as, for instance, Pennsylvania courts’ similar tests. So, 
forum-shopping and other Erie ills would not be of concern. 
However, Professor Morley has a ready response that I find 
compelling. In his new article, forthcoming in the Akron Law Review, he 
argues that it is not just the factor-test itself, but the state court case law 
applying the factors that is likely to differ in the particular issues 
considered under each factor; the weight given to each, and ultimately the 
outcome.27 Each element of the test, in a sense, is just a proxy for the body 
of law interpreting and applying that element. So, for instance, what 
 
 23.  Morley, supra note 2, at 275.  
 24.  See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 25.  Morley, supra note 2, at 259. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Michael Morley, Beyond The Elements: Erie and the Standards for Preliminary and 
Permanent Injunctions, 52 AKRON L. REV. 455 (2019) (stating that “. . . Even when federal and state 
standards involve facially identical elements, federal and state courts often interpret and apply them 
differently based on completely distinct bodies of precedent that can lead to different outcomes.”). 
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constitutes “irreparable injury” or the “public interest” are not answerable 
without reference to an underlying body of law. Therefore, when state law 
issues enter federal court through diversity jurisdiction, the injunction 
standards, as well as the underlying law, should be state law. 
III. TRADE SECRET LAW IMPLICATIONS 
Morley’s thesis has some very interesting implications for 
intellectual property law, particularly trade secret law. Prior to 
federalization on May 11, 2016, when plaintiffs could only bring state 
civil trade secret claims, federal courts in diversity cases naturally applied 
state law to decide the substance of those trade secret claims. This is, of 
course, required by the Erie doctrine. But when it came to determining the 
injunctive remedy, i.e., “equitable considerations,” it was much less clear 
which law courts were applying. 
To give one example, in SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 
1244 (3d Cir. 1985) the third circuit reviewed the lower court’s grant of a 
preliminary injunction in a trade secret misappropriation case involving 
former employees who allegedly used proprietary know-how relating to 
plaintiff’s materials handling system in a competing company. The third 
circuit ultimately overruled the district court in part, and narrowed the 
injunction to make it less vague and restrictive with respect to what the 
former employees could and could not do in their competing businesses.28 
The third circuit wrote (and this is pretty standard) that, “[i]n 
exercising pendent jurisdiction over trade secrets claims, federal courts 
must apply state law. In this case there is no dispute that under the choice 
of law principles of the forum state, Pennsylvania, it is the trade secrets 
law of Pennsylvania that we are to apply.”29 
The court then went on to apply Pennsylvania trade secret law to 
adjudicate the substance of the trade secret claim (existence of trade 
secrets and misappropriation).30 With respect to the standard for granting 
a preliminary injunction, however, the third circuit appeared to apply 
federal standards grounded in Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, but this is not entirely 
clear. Citing a prior third circuit case (applying Pennsylvania trade secret 
law), the court laid out the test for deciding whether to issue a preliminary 
injunction, stating: “a district court must weigh, in addition to the 
movant’s probability of success on the merits: (1) the threat of irreparable 
 
 28.  SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1255 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 29.  Id. (citing, e.g., Rohm and Haas Co. v. Adco Chemical Co., 689 F.2d 424, 428-29 (3d Cir. 
1982)). 
 30.  Id. at 1255-64. 
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harm to the movant if relief is denied; (2) the balance of harms; and (3) 
the public interest.”31 The third circuit went on, though, to cite to 
Pennsylvania state case law regarding the scope of an injunction once a 
“court of equity” has determined to grant one.32 
So, was the court applying federal law, state law, or a hybrid of both? 
The answer seems exceptionally important from the Erie perspective 
because, as anyone who has read even a small number of trade secret cases 
knows, courts can come to very different outcomes in trade secret cases 
depending on what state law they are applying. This is true even when 
courts are applying very similar-looking factor tests to decide on the 
appropriateness and nature of the remedy. Thus, if a federal court were 
free to use its own rules in deciding whether to issue an injunction in a 
state law trade secret case, the court would quite potentially reach a 
distinct outcome than a state court sitting in the forum. (Erie was not just 
a decision about forum-shopping, but that was a very big part of it.33) 
To see this forum-shopping risk, compare the following two cases in 
which federal courts applied California and Pennsylvania law, 
respectively. Both cases exhibit once again this strange “hybrid” 
procedure: the courts are ostensibly applying federal remedial law, yet 
also citing to state remedial law in the course of making the ultimate 
determination. The comparison also illustrates quite effectively that the 
issue is highly outcome determinative.34 
In Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, the third circuit affirmed 
the lower court’s decision to grant plaintiff Bimbo Bakeries’ request for a 
preliminary injunction preventing former Bimbo employee, Chris 
Boticella, from working for its competitor Hostess Bakery.35 Citing to 
third circuit case law applying Pennsylvania trade secret law, the court 
stated, as is standard, that the party seeking a preliminary injunction must 
satisfy four factors, “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) he or 
she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) granting 
 
 31.  Id. at 1263 (citing Continental Group v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 356-57 
(3d Cir. 1980) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 65)). 
 32.  Id. at 1265 (stating “[i]t is clear that under Pennsylvania law a court of equity may fashion 
a trade secret injunction that is broad enough to ensure that the information is protected.”) (citing Air 
Products and Chemicals v. Johnson, 296 Pa. Super. 405, 420-21 (1982)). 
 33.  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965) (stating that “[t]he [Erie] decision was also in 
part a reaction to the practice of ‘forum-shopping. . . .’”). 
 34.  Elizabeth Rowe and Sharon Sandeen’s phenomenal trade secret case book starts precisely 
with these two cases in order to demonstrate how differently trade secret cases can come out in 
different states. See ELIZABETH ROWE & SHARON SANDEEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE 
SECRET LAW 2-12 (2012). 
 35.  Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) 
the public interest favors such relief.”36 
Yet, in the course of applying the four factors, the third circuit and 
district court before it cited to significant Pennsylvania state case law. For 
example, in weighing the public interest, the court cited major 
Pennsylvania cases to conclude that “there is a public interest in 
employers being free to hire whom they please and in employees being 
free to work for whom they please. Of these latter two interests, 
Pennsylvania courts consider the right of the employee to be the more 
significant.”37 Even more significantly, the third circuit and the district 
court before it also cited to Pennsylvania state case law on the 
appropriateness of so-called “inevitable disclosure” injunctions.38 (An 
inevitable disclosure injunction is a controversial remedy in which courts 
prevent an employee from working for a new employer after concluding 
the employee will “inevitably” disclose her former employer’s trade 
secrets, despite her best efforts not to do so.39) 
It is not difficult to diagnose what the third circuit was doing here: 
effectively, an “Erie prediction.” The court was assessing the 
Pennsylvania state case law in order to determine what Pennsylvania 
courts would do in this situation. In the end, the third circuit decided a 
Pennsylvania court would have granted the requested preliminary 
injunction; probably in large part due to Pennsylvania state courts’ 
amenability to inevitable disclosure injunctions that prevent employees in 
possession of sensitive information from working for a direct competitor. 
Is this state substantive law, federal procedural law under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 65, open-ended federal common law, or some combination of the 
above? Again, unfortunately, I do not think it is entirely clear. It is 
certainly not as clear as we would wish given the stakes, because the 
principles the courts are applying in these situations are exceedingly 
outcome determinative. 
 
 36.  Id. at 109 (citing Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
 37.  Id. at 119 (citing Renee Beauty Salons, Inc. v. Blose–Venable, 438 Pa. Super. 601, 652 
(1995) (“[T]he right of a business person to be protected against unfair competition stemming from 
the usurpation of his or her trade secrets must be balanced against the right of an individual to the 
unhampered pursuit of the occupations and livelihoods for which he or she is best suited.”) (internal 
citation omitted); see Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569 (1960) (noting a societal interest in employee 
mobility)). 
 38.  See, e.g., Bimbo, 613 F.3d. at 110 (“In its opinion granting the preliminary injunction, the 
District Court stated: When analyzing threatened misappropriation of trade secrets, Pennsylvania 
courts apply the ‘inevitable disclosure doctrine.’”); Id. at 111 (“The leading Pennsylvania decision to 
discuss the inevitability of trade secret disclosure is Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Johnson.”) 
(citing Air Products, 296 Pa. Super. at 442). 
 39.  PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1266 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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We can instantly recognize this by looking at Clorox Co. v. S.C. 
Johnson & Son, Inc, a case with very similar facts to Bimbo: departing 
employee, downloaded files, leaving to work for a direct competitor.40 But 
in Clorox, a Wisconsin federal court applying California law reached a 
different outcome.41 Like the Bimbo court, the Clorox court generally 
applied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 65’s 
guidance on injunctions. In deciding whether to grant an injunction, the 
court ostensibly applied seventh circuit law—i.e. the Wisconsin federal 
court’s own remedial law—which uses a similar (not identical) factor test 
for determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction as the third 
circuit. The following excerpt from the court’s opinion is helpful for 
understanding the court’s process: 
The court now turns to [plaintiff] Clorox’s motion for a TRO and 
preliminary injunction. Clorox seeks an order against [defendant] SCJ 
and anyone acting in concert with it, prohibiting them from using or 
disclosing Clorox’s confidential proprietary and/or trade secrets and 
prohibiting [defendant] SCJ from employing, contracting or affiliating 
with [plaintiff’s former employee] Bailey. Before the court will issue 
preliminary injunctive relief, the party seeking such relief must first 
demonstrate the following: (1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the 
merits of the party’s claim; (2) that the party had no adequate remedy at 
law; and (3) that the party will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 
injunctive relief. If the moving party fails to demonstrate any of these 
threshold elements, the court must deny preliminary injunctive relief. If, 
however, the moving party meets the first three threshold elements, the 
court must then weigh the irreparable harm the moving party would 
suffer in the absence of an injunction against the irreparable harm the 
nonmoving party would suffer if the injunction were issued. The court 
must also consider the effects of granting or denying preliminary 
injunctive relief on any nonparties.42 
Yet after this lengthy recitation of the seventh circuit’s federal law 
standard for granting a preliminary injunction, the district court went on 
to deny the injunction by citing to California state case law on the 
appropriateness of inevitable disclosure injunctions—i.e. by citing to the 
law of the state from which the court was drawing the substantive trade 
 
 40.  627 F. Supp. 2d 954 (E.D. Wis. 2009). 
 41.  Id. at 968 (deciding California law governs the case).   
 42.  Id. at 970 (citing Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 474–75 (7th Cir. 
2001); Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of U.S., Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1086 (7th 
Cir. 2008)). 
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secret law governing the case.43 To me, this suggests the Wisconsin 
federal district court in Clorox, like the third circuit in Bimbo, conceived 
of much of the remedial law governing the ultimate granting or denying 
of an injunction as state law, and not conceptually distinct from the state 
substantive law of trade secrets governing the action. 
To summarize, Morley’s overall thesis is that federal courts violate 
Erie when they use a federal equity power to craft injunctions given how 
outcome-determinative this remedial calculus can be. The trade secret 
experience suggests that Morley is right on at least two fronts.  First, how 
courts apply the factors for issuing injunctions—the content of each factor 
with respect to issues like irreparable injury and balancing of interests, as 
well as the weight given to each factor—is outcome-determinative. A 
California court and a Pennsylvania court can reach distinct outcomes on 
similar facts even when ostensibly applying similar factor-tests and 
similar substantive law, due to their differing remedial approaches. 
Second, not relying on state law with respect to injunctions in state trade 
secret cases that enter federal court would violate Erie. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 
does not provide sufficient guidance to encompass the situation. Given 
that application of the factors clearly affects outcome, federal courts 
would have to apply state law in issuing injunctions. 
However, the trade secret experience leaves open a crucial question: 
are the courts actually violating Erie in practice? The way I read the 
opinions above, it isn’t entirely clear they are. The cases allow for several 
possibilities. One possibility is that the courts are applying federal equity 
law in full violation of Erie. Another possibility is that these courts are 
applying federal equity law in partial violation of Erie—they use federal 
opinions for the question of which factors to use in granting injunctions, 
and then cite to state law in the application, following Erie’s mandate to 
predict how state courts would apply the factors to reach an outcome. 
Yet a final possibility is that these federal courts are in fact applying 
state law all the way through and merely providing pro forma citations to 
Rule 65 and other federal circuit courts. Morley recognizes this 
 
 43.  Id at 968–69 (“. . . California courts have rejected the so-called inevitable disclosure 
theory, whereby a plaintiff may prove threatened misappropriation by showing that a former 
employee’s new employment will inevitably lead that employee to rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets. 
Therefore, a plaintiff must do more than show the defendant possesses trade secrets to prove a claim 
of threatened misappropriation of trade secrets.”) (citing, e.g., Cent. Valley Gen. Hosp. v. Smith, 162 
Cal. App. 4th 501 (2008); Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443 (2002) (“holding that 
the ‘inevitable disclosure doctrine cannot be used as a substitute for proving actual or threatened 
misappropriation of trade secrets’”)). 
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possibility.44 But he dismisses this hybrid approach as an incoherent way 
to conduct the analysis.45 I suppose, though, that it could be rationalized 
as an ad hoc division between procedure, on the one hand, and substance, 
on the other. For example, in the Bimbo case, the federal procedure is to 
assess, among other things, whether “the public interest favors such 
relief.”46 Meanwhile, the state of Pennsylvania’s substantive law of trade 
secrets proclaims Pennsylvania courts’ views on the extent to which free 
employee mobility serves the public interest, and the proper balance 
between employee mobility and protection for employers’ trade secrets.47 
IV. THANK YOU, CONGRESS, FOR SOLVING OUR PROBLEM? 
Regardless of whether federal courts were violating Erie prior to 
May 11, 2016, the bigger question for trade secret law is what will happen 
now that we have a federal claim for trade secret misappropriation under 
the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA). The DTSA does not preempt state 
claims or make jurisdiction exclusive to federal courts, which means that 
both state and federal claims can be brought in either state or federal 
court.48  Will federal courts hearing DTSA and state law claims apply 
federal standards or continue to cite to state case law with respect to 
appropriateness of injunctive remedies? 
We might think the answer now would be the former, at least when 
plaintiffs bring only federal claims or both federal and state law claims. 
But Professor Sandeen, along with Professor Christopher Seaman, 
suggest the latter. They argue that drawing on state case law is particularly 
appropriate given the language of the DTSA with respect to granting 
injunctions. As Sandeen and Seaman explain: 
. . . Congress amended early drafts of the DTSA to include a provision 
that makes it clear that state law principles must be applied with respect 
 
 44.  “Some circuits have instead reached the unusual compromise conclusion that, although 
federal law governs the elements for injunctive relief, federal courts must apply the state-law 
definitions of each element.” Morley, supra note 27, at 472 (citing Heil Trailer Int’l Co. v. Kula, 542 
F. App’x 329, 335 (5th Cir. 2013); JAK Prods., Inc. v. Wiza, 986 F.2d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 1993); 
Safety-Kleen Sys. v. Hennkens, 301 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir. 2002).) 
 45.  “Because each element of a doctrinal test is linked to a specific body of law interpreting or 
applying it, it is incoherent for courts to apply federal standards for injunctive relief but interpret them 
based on state law. Although a federal court applying federal standards for injunctive relief must 
consider state-law issues to determine a plaintiff’s ‘likelihood of success on the merits’ of a state-law 
claim or the availability of alternate state-law remedies, none of the other federal factors for injunctive 
relief similarly point to or incorporate state law.”  Id. at 32, n. 194. 
 46.  Bimbo, 613 F.3d at 109.   
 47.  Id. at 119 (citing Pennsylvania state case law). 
 48.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1838. 
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to the issuance of an injunction, thereby explicitly incorporating by 
reference a body of law that will continue to evolve at the state level. 
Specifically, this provision [codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)] 
states that a court may not grant an injunction that: “(I) prevent[s] a 
person from entering into an employment relationship, and that 
conditions placed on such employment shall be based on evidence of 
threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the 
person knows; or (II) otherwise conflict[s] with an applicable State law 
prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful profession, trade, or 
business.” 49 
Based on this statutory language, Sandeen and Seaman conclude that for 
DTSA claims, “federal courts are likely to limit the scope of injunctive 
relief against employees, particularly in cases where there is no evidence 
of actual or threatened disclosure or use of misappropriated trade 
secrets.”50 
I agree. This federal statutory language goes beyond the limited 
instructions in Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. It is an express direction from Congress: 
not to grant an injunction that prevents a defendant from entering an 
employment relationship (i.e. that tells defendant she cannot work at her 
desired place of employment under any circumstances, ever); not to place 
conditions on that relationship based “merely on the information the 
person knows” (i.e. based on a pure “inevitable disclosure” theory, 
without evidence of a threat to misappropriate); and not to ignore any state 
law prohibitions on employment restraints, like state bans on non-
competition agreements.51 With these instructions, Congress has at least 
recognized the Erie problem inherent in using federal standards when 
granting injunctions in trade secret cases. In response, Congress has 
effectively told federal courts (and state courts hearing DTSA claims) to 
use state law when issuing injunctions that affect an employment 
relationship—at least with respect to federal claims under the DTSA. This 
is similar to other scenarios where Congress has deferred to state law and 
state courts in lieu of forcing courts to address tricky Erie problems.52 
 
 49.  Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade 
Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 900 (2017) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A) (2016)). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See Viva R. Moffat, Human Capital as Intellectual Property? Non-Competes and the 
Limits of IP Protection, 50 AKRON L. REV. 903 (2016). 
 52.  Another example that comes to mind, courtesy of Megan LaBelle’s excellent article, An 
Erie Approach to Privilege Doctrine, 10 ConLawNOW 205 (2019), this issue, is Federal Rule of 
Evidence 501: The common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and 
experience—governs a claim of privilege unless any of the following provides otherwise: the United 
States Constitution; a federal statute; or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. But in a civil case, 
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On the other hand, ironically, Congress’s mandate in Section 
1836(b)(3)(A) to apply state law when issuing injunctions against 
employees technically only applies to DTSA claims. So, it may not solve 
the ambiguity discussed above in cases like Bimbo and Clorox, where 
plain vanilla state trade secret claims enter federal court. In such cases, 
courts will presumably continue to recite federal factor tests and cite to 
Fed. R. of Civ. P. 65, while also drawing on state law in the application. 
Is this still an Erie violation now that Congress has passed a federal trade 
secret statute? I leave that question for another day.53 
V. CONCLUSION 
The indeterminacy here really brings home one of the major themes 
of the conference and of the intellectual property law portion of the 
conference in particular. While we tend to talk about state and federal law 
in the IP space like they are two separate bodies of law, they are in reality 
often intertwined—to use Professor Sandeen’s phrase, “marbled.” The 
courts are not always applying one or the other. Trade secret and 
trademark law54 are the most robust illustrations of this “fundamentally 
interstitial lawmaking.”55 But even in patent law, Professor Ghosh’s paper 
shows, the courts may draw on state court decisions regarding contract 
issues, from ownership rules to the “on sale” bar.56 Copyright, too, 
exhibits this back-and-forth character. Indeed, as Professor Miller 
 
state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of 
decision. FED. R. EVID. 501 (emphasis added).   
 53.  Sandeen and Seaman have hinted that Erie mandates that federal courts look to state law 
in interpreting gaps in the language of the DTSA, so presumably they, like Morley, would see this as 
an Erie violation. Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 51, at 873 (“. . . although a federal statute is 
involved, the principles enunciated in Erie mean that the process must still pay due respect to state 
law.”). 
 54.  As Professor Sandeen’s new paper shows, the first post-Erie case to address an Erie 
question was a trademark case. Sharon K. Sandeen, The Erie/Sears/Compco Squeeze: Erie’s Effects 
on Unfair Competition and Trade Secret Law, 52 AKRON L. REV. 421, 429 ( 2019) (citing Kellogg 
Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938)); see also Tobias B. Wolff, Choice of Law and 
Jurisdictional Policy in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1847, 1857 (2017). 
 55.  See Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of  Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J. L. ECON. 
& POL’Y 17, 19 (2013) (stating that “[b]y holding that state law ordinarily governs any question not 
touched by positive federal enactments, Erie articulated a view of federal law as fundamentally 
interstitial in its nature; where Congress has not acted, the laws of the several states remain ‘the great 
and immensely valuable reservoirs of underlying law in the United States, available for the resolution 
of controversies for which otherwise there would be no law.’”) (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The 
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 492 (1954)). 
 56. Shubha Ghosh, Jurisdiction Stripping Of The Federal Circuit? 52 AKRON L. REV. 389 
(2019); Shubha Ghosh, Short-Circuiting Contract Law: The Federal Circuit’s Contract Law 
Jurisprudence and IP Federalism, 96 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 536 (2014). 
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observes, the first case to recognize that there is no such thing as federal 
common law without a word from Congress was not Erie—it was a 
copyright case.57 
 
 
 
 57.  Joseph Scott Miller, Brandeis’s IP Federalism: Thought on Erie at Eighty, 52 AKRON L. 
REV. 365, 372 (2019) (citing Wheaton v. Peters, ) 
